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  From Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999, we study the returns to human capital 
for workers observed in two leading manufacturing sectors. Workers in the mechanical and 
electrical industries (IMMEE) benefit from higher returns to human capital than their 
counterparts in the Textile-clothing industry.  In the IMMEE firms, low wage workers 
experience greater returns to labour market experience than high wage workers. The wage 
premium for on-the-job training is substantial for both sectors. However, taking into account 
whether formal training is still ongoing at the time of the survey, our results clearly indicate 
that workers bear heavy costs for their training. Our analysis shows that on-the-job training 
(OJT) and education can be efficient channels of policies aiming at raising earnings for low 
wages as well as high wages workers. However, careful consideration of the industrial sector 
should accompany these policies since specific impact of education, experience, OJT are found 
in the studied sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In estimated individual wage equations, researchers typically include returns to human 
capital and skills through regressors describing schooling and the worker’s experience
1. 
However, the experience and the knowledge accumulated within the firm may  differ  from 
experience previously obtained off the firm. Consequently, some of the return to human capital 
for the worker may come from the characteristics of the firm or of the industry in which she 
works. Thus, a wage equation for a worker may incorporate personal skill characteristics and 
firm knowledge characteristics.  As observed b y Abowd and Kramarz (1999), the return to 
schooling decreases after controlling for firms’ heterogeneity with fixed effects. Firm fixed 
effects and coefficients varying by industry can also be justified to account for selectivity or 
matching effects, economic rents correlated with human capital and other firm characteristics 
(Teal, 1996), or unemployment shocks affecting more some industries (Hoddinott, 1996). 
Meanwhile, vocational education and on-the-job training also affect the worker’s human capital 
characteristics.  
In this paper, we examine how the effects of human capital characteristics on individual 
wages arise and differ in two industrial sectors oriented toward exports in Tunisia, i.e. some of 
the most dynamic segments of the Tunisian economy. We base our econometric analysis on 
matched worker-firm Tunisian data that provides information both on employees and their 
firms. These data allow us to better understand inter-firm and inter-industry wage differentials 
for individuals with identical productive characteristics
2.  Inter-firm  or inter-industry  wage 
differentials are often explained by  non-competitive wage determination
3. Other approaches 
                                                        
1 Mincer (1993); Card (1999). 
2 Krueger and Summers (1988), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Goux and Maurin (1999), Abowd, 
Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (2000). See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a survey. 
3 Katz (1986) reviews the efficiency wage theories, Lindbeck and Snower (1989) review the insider-outsider 
models.    4 
stress more on compensating wages related to differences in jobs across industries (Murphy and 
Topel, 1987).  
Our data is also relevant for dealing with poverty issues. The policies conducted by 
Tunisian Governments since the independence have led to a substantial reduction in poverty
4. 
Hence, the poor are increasingly concentrated in peri-urban areas, particularly in Tunis
5, where 
our survey took place. As a consequence, we shall separate low wages and high wages in our 
analysis. 
The rise in unemployment has been limited over the past decade despite a growth rate of 
the active population above three percent, substantial lay-offs in public and private firms, and 
the  on-going rise  in  female labour market participation. However, the permanence of high 
unemployment (around 16 percent between 1994 and 1999) is a concern for the Tunisian 
authorities. Improving the qualifications of the Tunisian workforce should be part of the 
response to the high unemployment situation. 
In view of these unemployment issues, the Tunisian government has recently taken steps 
to reform the labour market. The Labour Code was revised in 1994, and again in 1996, to make 
clear the conditions under which workers can be laid off. It also establishes guidelines for 
financial compensation.  Moreover, w ith the elimination of the Multi-Fibre Arrangements 
scheduled to be completed by 2005 and the full implementation in 2007 of the Association 
Agreement with the EU, Tunisian firms will face fiercer  competition both in their export 
markets and in the local market. The association agreement will have substantial social 
implications. Indeed, the EU represents about 75 percent of imports and 80 percent of exports. 
It is expected that the adverse shocks will be harsher for the small and medium firms and the 
unskilled workers. High skilled workers should be able to find better jobs. In contrast, less 
skilled workers may suffer economic shocks related to liberalisation and privatisation. Low-
                                                        
4 The World Bank (2001); UNDP Tunis (1994). 
5  Muller (2004).   5 
wage workers may encounter employment difficulties and pressure to accept still lower wages. 
Improving sector productivity by raising human capital investment may help alleviate the 
adverse consequences of these shocks.  
From a broader international perspective, in 1994, the mean wage of unskilled industrial 
workers was lower than in Mediterranean competitors including  Morocco and Egypt 
(CNUCED/UNDP, 2001). However, for comparable skills, wages are still three times lower in 
China and India than in Tunisia. Therefore, developing the comparative labour advantages of 
Tunisia would require further investment in human capital in a context of growing globalisation 
of international exchanges. 
To deal with this new economic context, the Tunisian government initiated in 1996 a 
vigorous modernisation programme of the productive sector in order to assist firms in adjusting 
to liberalisation (MANFORME,  Mise à Niveau de la Formation Professionnelle et de 
l’Emploi). In particular, support was offered by the government for intra-firm human capital 
investment. The Tunisian authorities are notably stressing on vocational training. This 
corresponds to the two objectives of educating and preparing workers for a modern job market. 
Between 1996 and 1999, an investment value for 1161.7 million dinars (UNDP, 1994) has been 
spent on this programme. In  March 2000, more than 1300 firms had taken part into this 
programme, representing 40 percent of total employment in firms of more than 20 employees.  
The strategies pursued in the domain of vocational education and training should allow a 
significant progress of the skills of the Tunisian manpower. However, more efforts are deemed 
to be necessary as far as on-the-job training  (OJT)  is concerned, despite the mechanisms 
implemented in the programme MANFORME. Particularly, a stronger participation of the 
private sector is desirable (CNUCED/UNDP, 2001). 
It is generally considered that investment in OJT is a key element of the strategy to deal 
with emerging tensions in the labour market while the economy moves closer to international   6 
integration (The World Bank, 2001). Reforms of the education system will be instrumental to 
improve its responsiveness to emerging labour market demands. Recent labour studies reveal 
that job creation has been faster in urban areas, employment opportunities have been shifting 
toward higher skills, value added per worker is rising, and non-salaried jobs are increasing for 
men. The improvement in the education of the Tunisian workforce is accompanied by growth 
in labour productivity. Over 1989-97, value-added per worker increased by 17 percent, and by 
34 percent in the Textile sector. 
In 2002, the capacity of the  vocational education and training system was of 60 000 
individuals, which can be separated in 20 000 technical workers and 40 000 skilled workers 
(Belhareth and Hergli, 2000). This is consistent with the positive response of employers to 
vocational training. Thus, 90 percent of employers surveyed by Belhareth and Hergli (2000) 
stated to intend to provide some OJT. 
Schooling opportunities or vocational training may help alleviating poverty but only if 
education returns are high for the low wage categories. If it is not the case, then education 
investment may lead to higher growth but also to higher inequality and have little impact on 
poverty. 
Another question of interest in a context of economic reforms is: How does the minimum 
wage affect the wage distribution of low pay workers? Over 1989-97, wage changes were 
contained at the bottom of the pay scale in part because real minimum wages for agriculture 
and industry remain stable. Over this period, the industrial minimum wage decreased by only 1 
percent. This is important because firms may react to the imposition of a legal minimum wage 
by reducing non-pecuniary attributes of jobs. One of this attribute is intra-firm OJT. Leighton 
and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto (1982) suggest that, since human capital models predict 
workers will pay for part of any OJT through reductions in wages, a binding minimum wage   7 
may reduce training opportunity.  Consequently, OJT may be lower on jobs starting at the 
minimum wage, thereby worsening poverty. 
The Textile-clothing (thereafter ‘Textile’) and the Mechanics, Metallurgical, Electrical 
and Electronics Industries (IMMEE) are the two main exporting industrial sectors in Tunisia. 
They differ by decisive workforce characteristics. Workers in textile firms are majority female, 
while most of the workers in IMMEE firms are male. In 1998, the period of our survey, the 
textile  sector  represented more than 50  percent  of Tunisia’s employment in transforming 
industries. It is an ancient industry that is largely dominated by the branch of clothing (83 
percent of  its firms) which is low capital intensive but highly unskilled labour intensive. In 
contrast, the  IMMEE sector  is more recent,  especially its electronics branch, is  relatively 
human capital  intensive, and gathered  more than  10 percent  of Tunisia’s  industrial 
employment
6. 
Moreover, i n the Tunis area, where the  essential of these two sectors’ production is 
achieved and where industrial concentration is great and still increasing, IMMEE and textile 
firms both suffer severe  international  competition. For instance, the effects of international 
competition are  faced  by clothing and microelectronics units that are  generally  outsourcing 
firms.  For these firms, geographical  proximity to their European partners still constitutes a 
significant competitive advantage vis-à-vis their Asian competitors. However, given the much 
lower labour costs in some Asian countries, these Tunisian firms need to improve their use of 
human capital  to achieve productivity progress and raise  the quality of exported products. 
Indeed, d ata on mean labour productivity and skill structure (Belhareth and Hergli, 2000) 
shows that the IMMEE sector has a higher mean labour productivity than the textile sector 
(4.35 against 3.14). This may be explained by the higher proportion of high skill categories 
                                                        
6 See Nordman (2002a) for further descriptive analysis of these two sectors.   8 
(4.35 percent of engineers and executives for IMMEE against 3.14 percent, 6.24 percent of 
supervisory staff in IMMEE against 5.27 percent). 
How does human capital affect Tunisian workers’ wages for low and high wages in two 
industrial sectors oriented towards export? How do these two dynamic sectors differ as for the 
features of their wage distributions? What are the impact of on-the-job training and minimum 
wage on the wages in each sector? The aim of this paper is to study these questions by using 
unique matched worker-firm data. In Section 2, we present the data. We discuss estimation 
results for wage equations at different wage levels in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Tunisian matched worker-firm data  
 
The matched worker-firm data we use is discussed in details in Muller and Nordman 
(2004)
7.  In this data, we avail ourselves of information at worker level: individual 
characteristics, wages, educational investment, post-school training, total present experience in 
the labour market and occupation in the current firm. Moreover, the data include characteristics 
of the firms to which workers belong: organisational features, communication and training 
policies, innovation and competitive situations. 
Table 1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the surveyed firms. The four 
firms of each industrial sector are located in the Tunis area and belong to the formal sector. 
They are selected so as having no less than 50 employees, with vocation to export and capital 
ownership not entirely foreign. This firm sample corresponds to firms that typically suffer from 
shocks and policies we discussed above. The average size of the visited establishments is 130 
employees (respectively, for the textile and IMMEE sectors, 178 and 84 employees).  
                                                        
7 See Nordman (2002a, 2002b) and Destré and Nordman (2002) for the methodology of the Tunisian survey.   9 
Our data confirm the common finding that IMMEE firms use more human capital than 
textile firms. Indeed, workers’ mean education and mean labour market experience are higher 
in the former than in the latter (respectively, 11.25 versus 8.9 years for education; 6.7 versus 
4.9 years for job tenure and  9.8 versus 8.2 years for  total  experience)
8.  Although detailed 
comments on the other firms’ characteristics cannot be reported here for reasons of space, a few 
summary comments are in order: IMMEE firms provide OJT while textile firms do not; the 
former  exhibit higher supervision and management rates and also  report  greater level of 
stimulated communication (for instance, through regular meetings, distributed technical 
notices, notice board, etc.). These statistics are in accordance with the fact that the IMMEE 
sector makes more use of skilled labour. Finally, the textile firms seem more subject to high 
levels of competition than the IMMEE firms. The former may therefore be more concerned by 
diminishing its labour costs. 
Table 2 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics of the employees’ socio-economic 
characteristics and wages in these firms. The 231 workers in the final sample we use were 
interviewed in February 1999. Workers in the textile firms are mostly female (86 percent) while 
they are mostly male in the IMMEE (93 percent). It appears that workers in the IMMEE are 
slightly  more educated than their counterparts in the textile sector (10.6 versus 8.9 years of 
completed schooling)
9. For the IMMEE sector, this level of education corresponds to the first 
year of high school. Moreover, in the textile firms 1.6 percent of the observed workers have 
never gone to school while there is no illiterate in the IMMEE firms.   However, the proportions  
                                                        
8 These firm characteristics are calculated using workers’ sub-sample characteristics corrected by information 
collected using a questionnaire  addressed to employers ( that is, for most  firms, the true mean education of 
employees is observed).     
9 In contrast, calculating the education variable from the age at the end of school (from which we deduct 6 years), 
the average number of schooling years is 13.7 for workers in the IMMEE and 12 years for their counterparts in the 
textile. Thus, accounting for unsuccessful y ears of education, we choose to use an education variable net from 
repeated classes. Consequently, our schooling variable includes an important qualitative aspect. See on this point 
Behrman and Birdsall (1983).   10
of employees having received a vocational diploma related to their current job are similar across 
sectors and amount to about 32 percent. 
Not only IMMEE workers are more educated but they are also more experienced and 
trained since their average tenure amounts to 7.0 years versus 4.9 years for the workers in the 
textile sector. Formal training has been received for about 20 percent of the workers in the 
IMMEE firms  but for very few individuals in the textile  firms. 4  percent of the observed 
workers in the IMMEE are still continuing their training spells at the date of the interview. 
Finally, note that statistics about the characteristics of the occupations show that the IMMEE 
employees are more often attached to team work than employees  in the textile (54 percent 
versus 21 percent), while the proportions of observed supervisors or executives in the firms’ 
sub-samples are almost similar (about 19 percent).   
The wage characteristics are also worth noting. The average monthly wage declared by 
textile employees is 351 US dollars
10, while the average monthly wage for IMMEE workers is 
1.6 times the textile wage. This differential is consistent with the fact that in Tunisia the textile 
sector is the manufacturing industry with the lowest wage. Beyond differences in human capital 
endowments across sectors, the overwhelming proportion of females in the textile sample, for 
whom, ceteris paribus, wages may generally be lower than for males, might contribute to 
widening this rough sector wage differential
11.  
Figures 1 to 3 in Appendix show the histograms of observed wages. The minimum 
wages (SMIG, Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti) are indicated by vertical lines for 
40 hours and 48 hours per week, since different minimum wages are used for the two categories. 
In 1999, the SMIG of employees working 40 hours per week amounted to 156.7 dinars while 
                                                        
10 Overall, the average monthly wage corresponds to 1.8 times the monthly SMIG of 1997 for a regime of 48 hours 
per week (177.8 Tunisian Dinars, that is 125 US dollars in 2001). The declared monthly wages are those of January 
and February 1999. 
11 For gender issues on these data, one can refer to Nordman (2004).   11
that of 48 hour per week workers was 177.8 dinars
12. Workers in the textile sector are all subject 
to 48 hour work per week while, in the IMMEE sector, it only concerns non-executive workers. 
Figure 1 shows that the workers’  wages  in the two sectors  are concentrated around values 
slightly above the minimum wages, while heavy right tails account for a small number of very 
skilled workers. For the textile sector (Figure 2), wages are also very concentrated and often 
appear  below the  48 hour per week minimum wage.  As compared to Figure 2, the wage 
distribution in the  IMMEE sector (Figure 3)  has  shift well  above the minimum wages and 
presents a significant number of workers in the upper tail of the distribution. We are now ready 
to discuss the estimation results. 
 
3. The Estimation Results 
 
3.1 The model and the estimation method 
 
In the Mincerian earnings function, t he returns to  human capital are given by the 
coefficients of schooling and labour market experience often accompanied by their squared 
values
13. However, returns to human capital can vary across wage categories. For instance, high 
wage workers should not benefit from the same return to experience than low wage workers 
since the latter may have fewer incentives to make further on-the-job investment in human 
capital because they only deal with basic tasks. Alternatively, more educated individuals  – 
generally with higher wages – may have greater incentive to invest in training because they 
learn more quickly. As a result, the shape of the relationship between the workers’ wage level 
and  their  returns  to  education  and  work  experience  (former  experience  plus  tenure  in the  
                                                        
12 That is, 110 and 125 US dollars of 2001. 
13 More flexible polynomial specifications have been tried but cannot be accurately estimated with these data.   12
incumbent firm) is  unclear. To capture differentiated returns of education and experience 
between the rich and the poor, we construct two individual dummies indicating the workers’ 
relative position in the sample in terms of hourly wage (first quartile and fourth quartile). These 
two dummies ( QUARTILE1,  QUARTILE4) are allowed to interact with the main three human 
capital variables in the wage equation: education, tenure and previous work experience. In our 
estimates, t he reference category is then workers belonging to the middle of the wage 
distribution, that is, to the second and third quartiles
14.   
The lack of suitable matched worker-firm data for the wage analysis has been deplored 
by a number of authors, such as Rosen (1986) and Willis (1986), as such data allows the 
structure of wages to be modelled while controlling for firm-specific effects. With our matched 
data, we can deal with the firm heterogeneity by introducing firm dummy variables into the 
wage equation. Naturally, it is possible that part of what could be interpreted as the firms’ 
specific wage policy in the estimates (the coefficients on the dummy variables) is in fact a 
consequence of the worker selection by firms and vice versa. For example, very productive 
firms and workers may choose each other. In this paper, because of data limitations, we do not 
deal with this difficulty, and we assume that selectivity and sub-sampling effects can be 
neglected. 
Since we have cross-sectional data, we cannot model unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in the way of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). To temper the effects of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity which might bias the estimated coefficients, we add 
control variables to our OLS regressions and perform instrumented regressions (2SLS).  
  In the wage equations, we incorporate formal training received in the current firm 
(ongoing training and past training). In our pooled sample over both sectors, more educated 
                                                        
14 Statistics specific to each wage quartile show that workers’ characteristics differ according to wage level. Lower 
wage workers are less educated, trained and experienced. They are on average younger, mainly females and have 
suffered longer unemployment spells. These results suggest separate modelling of the wage rates at different wage 
levels.    13
workers generally receive more formal training: on average 12.2 years of schooling for workers 
having received formal training compared to 9.1 for the others. Together with the worker’s sex, 
two other dummy variables are retained in the regressions
15. One dummy variable controls for 
the worker’s hierarchical position in the firm (executive or supervisor, which we denote 
‘executive’ thereafter), while the other indicates whether the worker’s wage is close to the 
minimum wage (SMIG, see definition in Table 2 in Appendix). Workers who are executive are 
expected to have higher earnings.  
  We do not limit our analysis to the OLS results or 2SLS estimations. Introducing two 
dummies for quartiles in the regressors creates endogeneity problems that may be imperfectly 
corrected with instrumental variable methods. A way to avoid this difficulty is by using 
quantile regressions. Quantile regression estimators have recently become popular estimation 
methods (Koenker and Bassett, 1978), which have been employed for wage analyses 
(Buchinsky, 1998, 2001). They allow the researcher to concentrate her attention on specific 
parts of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. We use bootstrap confidence 
intervals for quantile regressions (Hahn, 1995). Let us now move on to the estimates. 
 
3.2 The wage equation estimates 
 
Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix present the regression estimates of the determinants of log 
hourly wages for workers in the textile and IMMEE sectors. The equality of the coefficients for 
separated wage functions for the textile and IMMEE is rejected (at the 1 percent level)
16. The 
first two columns in Tables 1 and 2 correspond to OLS estimates without quartile dummies as 
regressors. The following two columns show the results obtained when the returns to human 
                                                        
15 All the other socio-economic variables are dropped from the regressions for lack of significance and to preserve 
degrees of freedom given the limited sample sizes.  
16 The Fisher test statistics of the Chow test of equality of the coefficients for equation (1) in Tables 3 and 4 
amounts to 5.12.   14
capital can vary at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution through the inclusion of 
the two dummy variables for the first and fourth wage quartiles
17. 
The wage equation which incorporates firm’s fixed effects is characterised by better 
goodness-of-fit than the standard Mincerian wage function in the IMMEE sector. Fisher tests 
do not reject the fixed effect at 1 percent level. On the contrary, the firm dummies’ coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero for the textile sector.  As noticed by Abowd and 
Kramarz (1999), returns to schooling decrease after controlling for firms’ heterogeneity with 
fixed effects. In OLS regressions, the marginal return to education  is, respectively for the 
textile and IMMEE firms, 5.38 percent and almost 8 percent with  the  firm’s fixed effects 
instead of  5.51 and  9.35 percent without the firm dummies.  These drops  in the return to 
education in Tunisia are in the scope of usual results (Abowd and Kramarz, 1999)
18. To our 
knowledge, no comparable estimates exist on Tunisia
19.  
The return to education is significantly higher in the IMMEE firms than in the textile 
firms. High returns to education in IMMEE in 1999 may be explained by stylized facts of the 
labour market. Since IMMEE firms make more use of human capital than textile firms, it is not 
surprising to find greater rewards for schooling in the former sector than in the latter. Secondly, 
textile firms may be more concerned by raising their competitive advantage  vis-à-vis their 
Asian competitors in diminishing labour costs than IMMEE firms for whom activity is more 
turned towards high added value products, in particular in the electronics branch. This may 
affect the way employers reward qualifications in the Textile as compared to the IMMEE. 
Finally, some of the education effect may be caused by selection. Firm dummies may help 
                                                        
17 We also tested interactions of these dummies with the quadratic terms of the experience variables to take 
account of possible differentiated decreasing returns to experience across wage quartiles. However, since the 
results were little significant, we choose to exclude these interactions to preserve our degrees of freedom.  
18 With comparable equations using French data for these two sectors (1992 ECMOSS survey), we find a drop 
from 5.43 to 5.23 percent. See Destré and Nordman (2002) for fixed effect wage regressions using French data on 
these two sectors.  
19 Except Muller and Nordman (2004) who estimate wage equations grouping both sectors. See Psacharopoulos 
(1985, 1994, 2002) for surveys reporting the returns to education in numerous countries.    15
control for the selection effects, but other individual and household characteristics are missing 
which does not allow us to be fully protected against a selectivity bias.  
Columns (3), (4)  and (5)  elicit returns to human capital that are often  significantly 
different across wage quartiles, without and with adding the firm’s fixed effect, respectively. 
Table  5 summarises the main results of all these estimators by computing the  returns to 
education, job tenure and previous experience for the bottom (first quartile), the middle and the 
top (fourth quartile) of the wage distribution. In the textile sector, looking at OLS estimates, we 
find that the low wage workers (first quartile) have no significant returns to both education and 
previous experience while the high wage workers exhibit substantial returns to education (6.6 
percent) and experience (3.2 percent). In contrast, the returns to tenure follow a U curve along 
the wage distribution, i.e. low wage and high wage workers benefit from greater rewards for 
job seniority  (about 3.5 percent) than workers  in the second and third quartiles.  This is 
consistent with results found from quantile regression estimates in industrial countries, where 
returns to schooling are higher for the more skilled individuals (Martins and Pereira, 2004).  
In the IMMEE sector, the picture is somewhat different. The returns to human capital 
for the low wage workers are significantly different from zero and higher than that of their 
counterparts in the textile firms. For instance, the return to education in the first quartile is not 
significantly different from that estimated for workers in the middle of the wage distribution 
(about 3 percent). However, high wage workers display significantly greater returns to 
schooling (8.2 percent). As for tenure, its return is higher for the low wage workers while it is 
not significantly different from zero for middle and high wage workers at the 10 percent level. 
The results for experience emphasise the same U curve that describes its return as a function of 
the wage levels (respectively, 4.1, 1.8 and 3.7 percent).   
We attempt to control for the possible endogeneity of the education variable by using 
two-stage least square regression (2SLS) whose estimates are shown in column (5). Moreover,   16
the introduction of the two dummies for wage quartiles creates an additional source of 
endogeneity that must be dealt with. The set of instrument for both education and the wage 
quartiles is reported at the bottom of Tables  3 and 4
20. An important instrument for the 
worker’s education variable is the education level of the worker's father
21. For education, the 
main results remain unchanged (Table 5). However, the returns to human capital are refined: 
the average return to education increases from 2 percent (OLS) to 3 percent (2SLS) for textile 
workers, while it is stable at about 4 percent for IMMEE workers
22. In the textile sector, this 
return  is enhanced for the high wage workers while, in the IMMEE sector, the reward for 
education declines for these workers. Therefore, 2SLS estimates narrow the gap in the return to 
education across sectors. While the return to experience become not significantly different from 
zero for the textile workers, IMMEE workers continue benefiting from greater returns to tenure 
and experience than their counterparts in textile firms. Meanwhile, in the IMMEE sector and 
from both OLS and 2SLS estimates, the low wage workers seem better off than high wage 
workers as for their returns to labour market experience. In contrast, in the Textile, the high 
wages have greater rewards for their human capital endowments. 
We also investigate whether returns to human capital differ across the wage distribution 
by using quantile regressions for quantiles 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. These estimates are shown in 
columns (6), (7) and (8) of Tables 3 and 4. The results confirm the presence of gaps across the 
quartiles in the returns to education, tenure and previous experience (Table 5 ), though the 
coefficients on experience and tenure  are  often  insignificant, especially in the Textile. 
However,  some  of  our  previous results are sustained: firstly, there is indeed a higher return to  
                                                        
20 The values of the F-statistics and R
2 in instrumental equations ensure that we are not in the weak instrument case 
(Abadie et al., 2002). We attempted to instrument the experience variable as well, although this did not yield any 
good result since we lack additional instrumental variables to perform it in good conditions. 
21 This instrument, popular when using developing country data, may capture various genetic and environment 
influences (Sahn and Alderman, 1988). 
22 The increase is consistent with the effects of instrumental variables in some empirical works. For example, Card 
(1999) finds that for U.S. data, 2SLS estimates on returns to education are often 15 percent higher than OLS 
estimates.    17
education for the richest workers in textile firms. Secondly, in the IMMEE sector, workers at 
the bottom of the conditional wage distribution benefit from important returns to human capital 
and there is a persistence of a U curve describing the return to experience along the 
distribution. This last finding is also true in the textile firms (for tenure and experience) but the 
coefficients on the experience variables are not statistically significant at the usual confidence 
interval  (most likely, as a  result of the small sample size).  This is in contrast to different 
findings from Portugal in Machado and Mata (2001), where all aspects of human capital are 
relatively more valued only for high paying jobs. However, the last quartile corresponds to the 
highest returns to education in the Textile.  
Let us now look at the other estimated coefficients. Completed formal training plays an 
important role in explaining wage differentials ( in both sectors,  its coefficient is always 
significant at a 5 percent level and positive). This is consistent with theories that argue that 
wage differentials should reflect differences in training investment. The wage premium for any 
completed training amounts to about 55 percent in textile firms and to about 17 percent for 
IMMEE firms. This is a quite considerable training effect
23. Our regressions for IMMEE take 
into account whether formal training is still ongoing at the time of the survey (note that there is 
no individual with positive value on this variable in our textile firms). The negative coefficient 
on the variable taking into account ongoing training clearly indicates that workers bear the full 
costs of their formal training in accepting a lower wage during their training period  (also 
investigated with US data in Lynch, 1992; Barron et al., 1998; Parent, 1999). Indeed, according 
to Becker’s (1975) prediction, if training is at least partly general (as opposed to firm specific), 
one would expect a negative sign on the coefficient of the ongoing training variable. Then, in 
our IMMEE firms, the workers partly compensate for the provided training by accepting a 
lower wage during their training period. Since the evidence for such effect is often ambiguous 
                                                        
23 For a review of the magnitude of the returns to training see Frazis and Loewenstein (2003).   18
in US data, it is useful to obtain some evidence from Tunisian data. As shown by the estimates, 
they ultimately benefit from this training which provides them with a  large  positive wage 
premium when training is completed. 
Another interesting variable is the one indicating whether the worker’s wage is close to 
the legal minimum wage. There are evidences of two contradictory effects depending on the 
sector. In the textile sector, the impact of this variable on wage differentials is positive and 
significantly different from zero (equations 3, 4 and 5 in Table 3). However, in quantile 
estimates, the sign of its coefficient becomes negative for quantiles 0.5 and 0.75. Moreover, in 
IMMEE sector, there is no significant impact of the SMIG on wage differentials. In contrast, it 
does affect workers’ wage negatively when we look at its effect across the three categories of 
conditional wages in quantile estimates. Further empirical elements seem necessary to 
understand these results. However, they suggest that the impact of the SMIG on wages is 
largely industry specific and that it affects in an opposite way observed wages and unobserved 
heterogeneity at different conditional wage levels. 
Finally,  while  the estimates of the  textile  firm dummies’ coefficients are  never 
statistically significant, those of IMMEE firms are often large and significant at the 1 percent 
level (except for firms 1 and 2 when wage quartile dummies are included). For the IMMEE 
industry, t his is in accordance with the usual  persistence of  wage differentials across 
individuals with identical productive characteristics. Such wage differentials have been found 
in Tunisia in non-matched data (Abdennadher et al., 1994). This result shows that workers with 
comparable measured characteristics earn different wages partly because they belong to 
different firms. In this respect, Muller and Nordman (2004) have found that these firm effects 
can largely be explained by the firms’ human capital features and by the existence of intra-firm 
human capital externalities. Most likely, the observed IMMEE firms are able to foster human   19
capital diffusion across workers, unlike the observed textile firms, as a result of their higher 
management and supervision rates, mean education and experience.    
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we study the returns to human capital variables across wage levels in two 
industrial sectors of the  Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999.  With or without 
controlling for firm characteristics and for possible endogeneity of the education variable, our 
results show that workers belonging to the IMMEE sector benefit from higher returns to human 
capital than their counterparts in the Textile-clothing industry. Moreover, in the IMMEE firms, 
low wage workers (as defined in terms of wages or conditional wages) experience greater 
returns to experience  and tenure  variables than  high wage  workers.  Using  2SLS estimates 
narrows the gap in the return to education across sectors. Nevertheless,  IMMEE workers 
continue benefiting from greater returns to tenure and experience than their counterparts in 
textile firms. 
Meanwhile, in the IMMEE sector and from both OLS and 2SLS estimates, low wage 
workers seem better off than  high wage  workers as for their returns to human capital.  In 
contrast, in the Textile sector, the  high wages  always  get  greater rewards for their human 
capital endowments. We also performed quantile regressions for three different conditional 
wage categories and found that there is indeed a higher return to education for the high wage 
workers in textile firms.  Secondly, in the IMMEE sector, workers at the bottom of the 
conditional wage distribution benefit from important returns to human capital and there is a 
persistence of a U curve describing the return to human capital along this distribution.  
The wage premium for any completed training amounts to about 55 percent in textile 
firms and to about 17 percent for IMMEE firms. However, taking into account whether formal   20
training is still ongoing at the time of the survey, our regression results clearly indicate that 
workers bear heavy costs for their formal training: individuals benefiting from training during 
an initial period receive a lower wage than what they could g et without training. This is 
consistent with general predictions of human capital theory. Workers get returns from their 
training at a later period through the higher wages. According to Becker’s (1975) prediction, 
training would be then entirely general in our Tunisian surveyed firms. 
Let us turn to policy implications. The emerging tensions in the Tunisian labour market 
have adverse consequences in terms of job tenure uncertainty and negative pressure on wages 
for lower-skilled workers. Developing  education and formal training  can be viewed as a 
response to these tensions. Our results show that on-the-job training and  education  can be 
efficient channels of policies aiming at raising earnings for low wages as well as high wages 
workers. However, careful consideration of the industrial sector should accompany these 
policies since specific impact of education, experience, OJT are found in the studied sectors. 
There are also important poverty issues in Tunisia. Poverty has been found to be more 
concentrated in the textile sector among manufacturing sectors. This is consistent in our data 
with lower wages observed in the textile sector. We find that the return to on-the-job human 
capital  investment is particularly high for low wages in this industry. Therefore, this sector 
could play a role of skill promoter for low-skilled manpower in the context of a joint design of 
education and industry policies.  APPENDIX     
Table 1. Firms’ descriptive statistics  
 
  Textile sector  IMMEE  sector 
Variables  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
min  max  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
min  max 
Mean education of employees in the firm  8.90  1.22  7.76  10.58  11.25  3.15  8.62  15.40 
Mean tenure of employees in the firm  4.94  1.42  2.90  6.04  6.69  5.17  1.43  13.60 
Mean total experience of employees in the firm  8.20  1.79  6.58  10.57  9.79  5.48  3.61  16.9 
Mean age of employees in the firm  28.41  2.37  26.19  31.23  31.03  3.03  28.46  34.55 
Work independence stimulated (1: yes; 0: no)  0.25  0.50  0  1  0.25  0.50  0  1 
Level of stimulated internal communication (1 to 3)  0.50  0.58  0  1  1.75  1.50  0  3 
Level of competition (1 to 5)  4.50  0.58  4  5  1.75  0.96  1  3 
Regular work control (1: yes; 0: no)  0.50  0.58  0  1  0.50  0.58  0  1 
Age of the firm   10.75  4.92  5.00  17.00  10.13  7.28  3.50  20.00 
Number of intermediary levels of management   5.00  0.00  5  5  5.00  0.82  4  6 
Size (number of employees)  178.25  132.56  90  371  84.25  17.86  70  107 
Existing system of formal training (1: yes; 0: no)  0.00  0.00  0  0  0.50  0.58  0  1 
Task definition (1: globally defined; 0: precisely defined)  0.00  0.00  0  0  0.50  0.58  0  1 
Organizational innovation the last four years (1: yes; 0: no)  0.50  0.58  0  1  0.50  0.58  0  1 
Technological innovation the last four years (1: yes; 0: no)  0.75  0.50  0  1  0.50  0.58  0  1 
Percentage of exported production   1.00  0.00  1  1  0.21  0.28  0  0.60 
Exportation (1: yes; 0: no)   1.00  0.00  1  1  0.50  0.58  0  1 
System of versatility implemented (1: yes; 0: no)  0.75  0.50  0  1  0.50  0.58  0  1 
Percentage of employees working in chain   0.72  0.22  0.43  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Rate of supervision  0.06  0.01  0.05  0.07  0.15  0.08  0.08  0.25 
Rate of management  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.05  0.25  0.39  0.06  0.83 
Firms’ fixed effects                 
Firm 1          0.292  0.457  0  1 
Firm 2          0.349  0.479  0  1 
Firm 3  0.264  0.442  0  1         
Firm 4  0.24  0.428  0  1         
Firm 5  0.24  0.428  0  1         
Firm 6          0.189  0.393  0  1 
Firm 7          0.170  0.377  0  1 
Firm 8  0.256  0.438  0  1           22 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the workers’ characteristics 
 
  Textile sector  IMMEE sector 
Variables  Mean  Standard 
deviation  min  max  Mean  Standard 
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Age of individuals (AGE)  28.328  7.203  15.000  52  30.953  8.207  18  52 
Sex (FEMALE, 1: woman; 0 man; conversely for MALE)  0.864  0.344  0  1  0.066  0.250  0  1 
Geographical origin (PROVE, 1: rural area; 0 otherwise)  0.152  0.360  0  1  0.142  0.350  0  1 
Matrimonial situation (MARI, 1: if married; 0 if divorced, widowed or single)  0.336  0.474  0  1  0.406  0.493  0  1 
Single male (CELIBAH, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)      0.088  0.284  0  1  0.557  0.499  0  1 
Number of dependant children (ENFT)  0.488  0.930  0  5  0.689  1.190  0  5 
Father has a level of Primary school (PPRIM, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.192  0.395  0  1  0.151  0.360  0  1 
Father has a level of Secondary school (PSECON, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.128  0.335  0  1  0.208  0.407  0  1 
Father has a level of Higher education (PSUP, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.064  0.246  0  1  0.198  0.400  0  1 
Father is illiterate (PANAL, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.184  0.389  0  1  0.208  0.407  0  1 
Years of schooling (EDUCATION)  8.910  3.439  0  18  10.580  4.182  2  17 
Previous apprenticeship in a firm (APPRENTI, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.400  0.492  0  1  0.321  0.469  0  1 
Periods of internship related to the current job (STAGA, in months)  0.920  2.778  0  18  2.113  4.332  0  24 
Periods of internship not related to the current job (STAGAN, in months)  0.004  0.045  0  0.5  0.017  0.079  0  0.5 
                 
Periods of unemployment (CHOMA, in years)  2.012  3.578  0  18  0.645  1.158  0  5 
Previous relevant experience (EMSIM,  1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.552  0.499  0  1  0.557  0.499  0  1 
Previous total professional experience (EXPERIENCE, in years)  3.240  4.701  0  22  3.286  4.698  0  22 
Start date in the current firm (ENTREE)   1993.17  3.723  1980  1997.9  1991  7.577  1968  1997.9 
Tenure in the current firm (TENURE, in years)  4.913  3.723  0.167  17.333  7.059  7.577  0.167  30.083 
Formal training received in the current firm (FORMAD, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.016  0.126  0  1  0.377  0.487  0  1 
Formal training period in the current firm in years (FORMAA)    0.003  0.027  0  0.25  0.195  0.457  0  3 
Ongoing formal training in the current firm (FORSTIL, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.000  0.000  0  0  0.038  0.191  0  1 
Member of an union (SYNDIC, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.048  0.215  0  1  0.387  0.489  0  1 
Work in team (EQUIPE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.216  0.413  0  1  0.547  0.500  0  1 
Work in chain (CHAINE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.592  0.493  0  1  0.000  0.000  0.00  0.00 
Executive or supervisor (ENCADR, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.184  0.389  0  1  0.198  0.400  0  1 
                 
Hourly wage (SALH, in dinars)  1.384  0.898  0.292  6.1698  2.493  1.532  0.586  7.572 
Log of hourly wage (LNSALH)  0.201  0.460  -1.232  1.8196  0.753  0.561  -0.535  2.024 
Monthly wage (SAL, in dinars)  246.691  160.023  52  1100  395.838  273.642  87  1350 
Proximity to the minimum wage (SMIG, 1: if 156<=SAL<=178; 0 otherwise)  0.176  0.382  0  1  0.0188  0.136  0  1   
Figure 1. Distribution of Observed Monthly Wages of all Workers  
(Textile and IMMEE) 
 
































































Figure 2. Distribution of Observed Monthly Wages of Workers in the Textile Sector 
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Table 3. Wage Equations for Workers in the Textile Sector 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage (LNSALH) 
 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
 (2SLS) 
Quantile regressions 
(bootstrap standard error: 20 iterations) 











Firm fixed effects 
model 
(4) 












Constant  -0.5203***  -0.4941***  0.0777  0.1389  -0.0030  -0.0075  0.5509*  0.2422 
  (3.62)  (3.18)  (0.52)  (0.87)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (1.91)  (0.62) 
Education  0.0551***  0.0538***  0.0039  0.0030  0.0161  0.0189  0.0160  0.0397** 
  (6.14)  (5.71)  (0.36)  (0.27)  (0.63)  (1.01)  (1.42)  (1.98) 
Tenure  0.0885***  0.0894***  0.0429**  0.0383**  0.0684**  0.0431  0.0103  0.0200 
  (4.47)  (4.25)  (2.53)  (2.19)  (2.59)  (1.08)  (0.53)  (0.46) 
Tenure
2  -0.0033**  -0.0035**  -0.0030**  -0.0028**  -0.0054***  -0.0012  0.0007  0.0002 
  (2.35)  (2.33)  (2.35)  (2.09)  (3.01)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.06) 
Experience  0.0361**  0.0377**  0.0064  0.0029  -0.0090  0.0184  0.0024  0.0158 
  (2.50)  (2.32)  (0.51)  (0.20)  (0.45)  (0.66)  (0.24)  (0.67) 
Experience
2  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0000  0.0014  -0.0002  0.0007  0.0005 
  (0.35)  (0.42)  (0.21)  (0.03)  (1.27)  (0.14)  (0.80)  (0.46) 
QUARTILE1  _  _  -0.7846***  -0.7965***  -0.5357  _  _  _ 
      (4.28)  (4.30)  (1.13)       
QUARTILE4  _  _  -0.5161**  -0.5812**  -0.5498  _  _  _ 
      (2.04)  (2.22)  (1.12)       
Education*QUARTILE1  _  _  0.0061  0.0067  -0.0012  _  _  _ 
      (0.33)  (0.36)  (0.02)       
Education*QUARTILE4  _  _  0.0595***  0.0636***  0.0571*  _  _  _ 
      (3.26)  (3.38)  (1.68)       
Tenure*QUARTILE1  _  _  0.0243  0.0157  -0.0333  _  _  _ 
      (1.09)  (0.66)  (0.64)       
Tenure*QUARTILE4  _  _  0.0339**  0.0353**  0.0515*  _  _  _ 
      (2.40)  (2.44)  (1.84)       
Experience*QUARTILE1  _  _  0.0099  0.0112  0.0316  _  _  _ 
      (0.52)  (0.58)  (0.59)       
Experience*QUARTILE4  _  _  0.0296***  0.0294***  0.0037  _  _  _ 
      (2.71)  (2.66)  (0.18)         26 
Ongoing formal training  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ 
                 
Completed formal training  0.5582**  0.5617**  0.5381***  0.5525***  0.6298***  0.5282  0.0175  0.3713 
  (2.55)  (2.53)  (3.19)  (3.24)  (3.22)  (1.20)  (0.04)  (1.39) 
Executive or supervisor  0.1847**  0.1906**  0.0069  0.0126  0.0606  0.1088  0.1459  0.3307** 
  (2.02)  (2.05)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.64)  (1.10)  (0.79)  (2.28) 
Proximity to the minimum wage  -0.0450  -0.0337  0.4811***  0.5087***  0.4852*  0.0259  -0.0824**  -0.1122* 
  (0.66)  (0.46)  (4.49)  (4.63)  (1.72)  (0.39)  (2.11)  (1.77) 
Female   -0.2553***  -0.2565***  -0.1230*  -0.1296*  -0.1413  -0.2997  -0.6428***  -0.5050*** 
  (2.99)  (2.96)  (1.75)  (1.82)  (1.58)  (1.45)  (2.93)  (3.51) 
Firm3  _  -0.0435  _  -0.0554  -0.1006  -0.1002  -0.0490  -0.0476 
    (0.58)    (0.96)  (1.48)  (1.25)  (0.74)  (0.62) 
Firm4  _  -0.0279  _  0.0235  0.0161  -0.1486  -0.0521  0.0491 
    (0.34)    (0.35)  (0.18)  (1.19)  (0.76)  (0.33) 
Firm8  _  0.0020  _  -0.0416  -0.0889  -0.0317  -0.0398  -0.0103 
    (0.02)    (0.65)  (1.22)  (0.32)  (0.67)  (0.09) 
R
2  0.66  0.66  0.83  0.83  0.79       
Pseudo R
2            0.27  0.36  0.54 
Observations  125  125  125  125  125  125  125  125 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The instrumented variables in the IV regression (5) are: Education QUARTILE1 QUARTILE4 Education*QUARTILE1 Education*QUARTILE4 Tenure*QUARTILE1 Tenure*QUARTILE4 
Experience*QUARTILE1 Experience*QUARTILE4  
The additional instruments used in the IV regression (besides the exogenous variables of equation 5) include: age, (age)
2, apprenti, celibah, chaine, choma, (choma)
2, 
choma*female, emsim, enft,  (enft)
2, log(enft), enft*age, entree, equipe, formaa, (formaa)
2, (formaa)
3, formaa*female, forstil*female, mari*female, mari*female, 
mari*male, panal, panal*age, panal*choma, panal*enft, panal*formaa, pprim, pprim*age, pprim*choma, pprim*enft, pprim*formaa, psecon, psecon*age, psecon*choma, 





The definitions of the variables and instruments appear in Table 1.   
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Table 4. Wage Equations for Workers in the IMMEE Sector 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage (LNSALH) 
 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
 (2SLS) 
Quantile regressions 
(bootstrap standard error: 20 iterations) 











Firm fixed effects 
model 
(4) 












Constant  -0.5623***  -0.0883  0.2299*  0.3382**  0.2789  -0.2217  0.4491*  0.3290 
  (4.42)  (0.53)  (1.75)  (2.10)  (1.29)  (0.63)  (1.69)  (1.17) 
Education  0.0935***  0.0796***  0.0288***  0.0317***  0.0316**  0.0857***  0.0556***  0.0656*** 
  (9.32)  (7.78)  (3.10)  (3.34)  (2.58)  (4.43)  (3.72)  (3.86) 
Tenure  0.0028  0.0280**  -0.0011  0.0016  -0.0100  0.0392**  0.0252  0.0242 
  (0.21)  (2.17)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.73)  (2.00)  (1.55)  (1.20) 
Tenure
2  0.0003  -0.0005  0.0003  0.0002  0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0003  -0.0004 
  (0.58)  (0.90)  (0.77)  (0.39)  (1.24)  (0.75)  (0.52)  (0.48) 
Experience  0.0560***  0.0607***  0.0260*  0.0288**  0.0417**  0.0755***  0.0367  0.0599*** 
  (3.12)  (3.85)  (1.90)  (2.12)  (2.44)  (3.56)  (1.54)  (2.77) 
Experience
2  -0.0019*  -0.0024***  -0.0010  -0.0013*  -0.0018**  -0.0036**  -0.0012  -0.0028 
  (1.89)  (2.66)  (1.33)  (1.73)  (2.02)  (2.38)  (0.90)  (1.61) 
QUARTILE1  _  _  -0.4875**  -0.4943**  -0.6240**  _  _  _ 
      (2.50)  (2.55)  (2.38)       
QUARTILE4  _  _  0.2156  -0.2609  -0.0833  _  _  _ 
      (0.44)  (0.48)  (0.10)       
Education*QUARTILE1  _  _  -0.0063  -0.0107  -0.0086  _  _  _ 
      (0.33)  (0.56)  (0.32)       
Education*QUARTILE4  _  _  0.0317  0.0502  0.0455  _  _  _ 
      (1.07)  (1.63)  (1.01)       
Tenure*QUARTILE1  _  _  0.0348**  0.0368**  0.0668**  _  _  _ 
      (2.27)  (2.39)  (2.37)       
Tenure*QUARTILE4  _  _  -0.0133  -0.0022  -0.0115  _  _  _ 
      (1.49)  (0.20)  (0.77)       
Experience*QUARTILE1  _  _  0.0175  0.0200*  0.0071  _  _  _ 
      (1.53)  (1.77)  (0.45)       
Experience*QUARTILE4  _  _  0.0015  0.0138  -0.0057  _  _  _ 
      (0.09)  (0.75)  (0.20)         28 
Ongoing formal training  -0.6246***  -0.4526***  -0.3653***  -0.3326***  -0.3251***  -0.3452  -0.5285**  -0.2375 
  (3.65)  (2.95)  (3.49)  (3.18)  (2.88)  (1.14)  (2.07)  (0.76) 
Completed formal training  0.3321***  0.2268***  0.1661***  0.1581***  0.1730***  0.2201**  0.2173***  0.1396 
  (4.74)  (3.05)  (3.65)  (3.03)  (3.02)  (2.40)  (2.80)  (1.40) 
Executive or supervisor  0.2540***  0.2476***  0.1395**  0.1483**  0.1524**  0.1589*  0.1711*  0.2820** 
  (2.81)  (3.07)  (2.38)  (2.50)  (2.04)  (1.80)  (1.98)  (2.35) 
Proximity to the minimum wage  -0.1707  -0.2595  -0.1260  -0.1441  -0.2669  -0.2457*  -0.4482**  -0.3254* 
  (0.75)  (1.28)  (0.78)  (0.90)  (1.29)  (1.97)  (2.31)  (1.67) 
Female   0.0068  -0.0535  -0.0121  0.0027  0.0030  -0.2359  -0.0615  -0.0746 
  (0.05)  (0.48)  (0.14)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.98)  (0.28)  (0.30) 
Firm1  _  -0.4534***  _  -0.1164  -0.0284  -0.6607***  -0.7573***  -0.5584*** 
    (4.18)    (1.31)  (0.25)  (3.47)  (4.05)  (3.53) 
Firm2  _  -0.4248***  _  -0.1022  0.0054  -0.5729***  -0.6337***  -0.5271*** 
    (4.08)    (1.10)  (0.04)  (2.98)  (4.66)  (3.07) 
Firm7  _  -0.5775***  _  -0.2209**  -0.1207  -0.7328***  -0.6949***  -0.6268*** 
    (5.61)    (2.17)  (0.85)  (4.24)  (4.45)  (4.62) 
R
2  0.73  0.80  0.91  0.92  0.91       
Pseudo R
2            0.52  0.56  0.65 
Observations  106  106  106  106  106  106  106  106 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The instrumented variables in the IV regression (5) are: Education QUARTILE1 QUARTILE4 Education*QUARTILE1 Education*QUARTILE4 Tenure*QUARTILE1 Tenure*QUARTILE4 
Experience*QUARTILE1 Experience*QUARTILE4  
The additional instruments used in the IV regression (besides the exogenous variables of equation 5) include: age, (age)
2, apprenti, celibah, chaine, choma, (choma)
2, 
choma*female, emsim, enft,  (enft)
2, log(enft), enft*age, entree, equipe, formaa, (formaa)
2, (formaa)
3, formaa*female, forstil*female, mari*female, mari*female, 
mari*male, panal, panal*age, panal*choma, panal*enft, panal*formaa, pprim, pprim*age, pprim*choma, pprim*enft, pprim*formaa, psecon, psecon*age, psecon*choma, 





The definitions of the variables and instruments appear in Table 1.   





Table 5. Returns to Human Capital Across Wage Quartiles and Sectors with Firm Fixed Effects Models 
 
  OLS   2SLS   Quantile regressions 



















  Textile  
Education  0.0097 
ns  0.0030
 ns  0.0665  0.0205  0.0149
 ns  0.0161
 ns  0.0733  0.0301  0.0189 
ns  0.0160
 ns  0.0397 
Tenure
a  0.0331  0.0116  0.0369  0.0233  -0.0050  0.0174  0.0496  0.0199  0.0312
 ns  0.0168




 ns  0.0027
 ns  0.0320  0.0129  0.0273
 ns  -0.0001
 ns  0.0076
 ns  0.0087  0.0168
 ns  0.0071
 ns  0.0192
 ns 
  IMMEE 
Education  0.0210  0.0317  0.0819  0.0415  0.0230  0.0316  0.0771  0.0408  0.0857  0.0556  0.0656 
Tenure  0.0392  0.0046
 ns  0.0010
 ns  0.0124  0.0600  0.0018
 ns  -0.0155
 ns  0.0120  0.0308  0.0212
 ns  0.0183
 ns 
Experience  0.0414  0.0188  0.0374  0.0291  0.0380  0.0272  0.0284  0.0302  0.0520  0.0287
 ns  0.0417 
     a : returns calculated at the average point of the sub-sample. 
b : mean of the effects for the different quartiles.
 ns : no significantly different from zero at 10% level.  
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